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Abstract
Disaster governance encompasses the responsibility andmanagement of disaster mitigation, relief and recovery as well as
power and politics around these areas of action. Research on disaster governance focuses on various scales of action when
examining the implications of disaster governance frameworks for particular populations and there is growing scholarship
on the impacts that national politics and programmes have on local efforts. Under-represented in these discussions is an
engagement with the relationality of disaster governance within national boundaries, not just vertically (i.e., the local in
relation to the national) but horizontally—the local in relation to other locals. Through an examination of Ladakh in relation
to neighbouring Kashmir, this article shows how local efforts to enhance disaster governance have been stymied both by
the vertical (local-centre) politics of border security and conflict, as well as by thematerial effects that politics and violence
in neighbouring Kashmir Valley have on Ladakh.
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1. Introduction
Disaster governance encompasses disaster risk reduc-
tion (DRR), mitigation, emergency response and recov-
ery as well as knowledge production around these
areas of action (Tierney, 2012). This term recognises the
diverse set of state and non-state actors that are involved
in disaster-related activities across the hazard cycle, and
focuses attention on the messy intersection of wider
societal governance frameworks with power, decision-
making and politics duringmoments of crisis (Pal & Shaw,
2018, p. 4; Tierney, 2012, p. 342). As such, the term
demands a highly contextualised look at the structural
arrangements, processes and politics through which dis-
aster risk, response and knowledge are shaped at various
levels of societal governance.
Academic debates on disaster governance acknowl-
edge the importance of attention to various scales of
areas and actors (local, national, regional and interna-
tional) when examining the implications of disaster gov-
ernance frameworks for particular populations (Forino,
Bonati, & Calandra, 2018; Hilhorst, 2013; Lassa, 2010;
Tierney, 2012). Most relevant to this article is the schol-
arly work on the subnational scale, which offers, typ-
ically, a close examination of disaster governance in
one village/town/city/province, sometimes in relation
to national-level power and politics, or else as a stand-
alone study (for example, Heijmans, 2013; Kita, 2017).
This literature explores how local political leaders and
technocrats affect disaster risk while making everyday
governance decisions—for example, over land use or
funding allocations for public services. It also high-
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lights how businesses, non-profits and other local non-
governmental actors play a role in shaping knowledge
and action around disasters (Bhatt, 2018, p. 32). In con-
flict zones, scholars have shown how a disaster can result
in armed non-state and state actors taking on different
enabling or obstructive roles on the ground, supporting
or competing with national authorities (Hilhorst, Mena,
van Voorst, Desportes, & Melis, 2019; Hyndman, 2011;
Walch, 2014). Under-explored in these discussions is
the horizontal relationality of disaster governance with-
in national boundaries. Namely, the local in relation to
other locals.
Governance decisions in one local area by local
and national actors may directly impact the disaster
risk profile of its neighbour. Along these lines, there is
growing scholarship on collaborative disaster manage-
ment across local boundaries (Kapucu & Hu, 2016; Kuo,
Wang, Chang, & Li, 2015); i.e., how neighbouring local
governments and/or non-state actors work together to
address a crisis that affects one or both regions. However,
the extent to which governance decisions in neighbour-
ing localities undermine or destabilise another’s disas-
ter governance policies or aspirations remains under-
explored—leaving knowledge gaps around responsibility
and accountability. This article seeks to address that gap
with a case study focus on the disaster governance poli-
tics and processes of Ladakh, a remote region in India, as
they have been affected by power and conflict politics in
neighbouring Kashmir.
Ladakh and Kashmir are in a climatically-sensitive
region of the Himalayas and have suffered significant
recent disasters—a cloudburst in Ladakh in 2010 and
floods in Kashmir in 2014. Both erstwhile divisions of
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) state are also part of a wider
conflict border zone, bordering Pakistan on the Kashmir
side, and Pakistan and China for Ladakh. Moreover, both
regions have a historically complex, although quite differ-
ent, relationship with the state and central governments
in Srinagar and Delhi. Ladakhi political narratives have
long conferred a sense that Ladakh’s governance aspira-
tions have been thwarted by communal politics, devel-
opment priorities and outbreaks of violence in Kashmir.
This article explores those narratives in relation to disas-
ter governance in Ladakh. It shows how Kashmir-related
politics and conflict have continued to limit Ladakhi
efforts to augment the region’s disaster preparedness
and mitigation, despite their separate disaster manage-
ment structures and authority.
In short, this article uses a case study to call for
closer attention to the ways that local territories are
directly and indirectly connected to other local areas,
and how these messy, overlapping (political) relations
affect the disaster governance policies, programmes and
aspirations in neighbouring locales. It is hoped that the
lens of relationality can be applied in other contexts—
particularly in situations of internal conflict, where con-
flict politics in one localemay spill over to affect the disas-
ter risk and governance situation of a neighbouring area,
even when the violence itself does not extend across
internal boundaries. With this conflict backdrop, I also
hope to contribute to discussions on the conflict-disaster
nexus (Hilhorst, 2013; Hilhorst et al., 2019; Siddiqi, 2018;
Venugopal & Yasir, 2017;Walch, 2014), through highlight-
ing new ways that conflict dynamics can contribute to
hazard vulnerability.
To make these arguments, the article opens with an
overview of data collection and a note on Ladakh’s cur-
rent governance context in light of recent changes. Then,
to set the national scene, I offer a broad overview of
disaster management in India and the disaster gover-
nance characteristics of other states. This is followed by
an overview of the politics and hazard profile of Ladakh
and, in Section 5, an analysis of how and why Ladakh’s
administration has failed to improve their disaster gover-
nance framework since the 2010 disaster. Section 6 then
expands on the relational nature of disaster governance
in Ladakh and examines future disaster risk, as it explains
how Ladakh’s hazard vulnerability is intricately bound up
with conflict politics in Kashmir.
2. Research Methods and a Note on Ladakh’s Status
Research for this article was conducted between
2017–2019 in Leh and Kargil (Ladakh’s two districts),
building on two funded projects. The first examined dis-
aster resilience and governance in Ladakh and included
12 interviews with key figures linked to disaster gover-
nance through their leadership roles in disaster manage-
ment and/or civil society: the then-Additional Deputy
Commissioner (ADC) Leh, the then-Chief Executive
Councillor of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development
Council Kargil, two government officials from tourism
in Leh and education in Kargil, two researchers that
worked on the 2010 Leh District Disaster Management
Plan and efforts to revise it, two leaders from local
Muslim and Buddhist faith associations in Leh, three
local NGOs’ workers in Leh, and a journalist-activist in
Kargil. Initial respondents—a researcher on the District
Disaster Management Plan and local NGO workers—
were sourced through personal contacts, and subse-
quent respondentswere snowballed from there. The sec-
ond project examined the governance of tourism and
trade in Ladakh in relation to wider conflict politics and
its remote, hazard-exposed location. For this project,
colleagues and I undertook five interviews with lead-
ers of different market trading associations in Leh who
were snowballed from contacts established by our local
research assistant. These interviews have been used to
inform the article’s wider analysis of everyday gover-
nance in relation to Ladakh’s geographical remoteness
and conflict politics. Finally, the analysis is also built
on my experience of engaging with the Leh administra-
tion in Ladakh on the revision of their District Disaster
Management Plan (DDMP; Leh District Administration
[LDA], 2011). Colleagues from University College London
and the University of Jammu and I hosted a series of
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workshops with the ADC of Leh and other officials in
2017 and 2019 (referred to hereafter as the ‘DDMP con-
sultations’) and offered extensive feedback on how to
improve the existing DDMP for Leh in 2019. Much of
this article’s analysis focuses on Leh district, as it was
the worst affected by the 2010 floods and interviews
centred heavily on the subsequent evolution of the Leh
DDMP. As I briefly explain later, Kargil has different social
and political dynamics that affect its own disaster gover-
nance within Ladakh. Nonetheless, this article retains its
all-Ladakh frame, as many of the observations around
disaster management plan development and the effects
of conflict politics in neighbouring Kashmir are relevant
to both districts.
During the course of this research, J&K has under-
gone a significant governance transformation. Prior
to February 2019, Leh and Kargil districts enjoyed
a relative level of autonomy through their respec-
tive Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils,
although Ladakh as a whole fell under the administra-
tive division of Kashmir. In February 2019, Ladakh gained
divisional status alongside Kashmir and Jammu. Then, on
5 August 2019, the Indian government revoked the spe-
cial status of the entire J&K (protected under Article 370
of the Constitution) and passed a Bill reorganising it
into two separate Union Territories (UT) of Jammu and
Kashmir and Ladakh.While the details of the governance
of the new UTs are still evolving, this status change has
significantly reduced the autonomyof the erstwhile state.
As the situation remains dynamic, this article focuses
mainly on events from the 2010 cloudburst in Ladakh up
until UT status implementation began in October 2019.
3. Disaster Governance in India
Disaster governance refers to the way society manages
its disaster risks (Lassa, 2011, p. 114), and it calls atten-
tion to the diversity of actors involved in disaster-related
activity, and the multiplicity of processes that affect
disaster risk—economic, social and political (Tierney,
2012, p. 342). It departs from the concept of disaster
management, which typically focuses on the narrow-
er work of governments in relation to reducing disas-
ter risk—through, legislation, planning and administra-
tion, for instance (Lassa, 2011; Tierney, 2012, p. 342).
Moreover, the concept disaster governance gives space
for the consideration of how actors and processes not
directly concerned with disasters may work towards, or
against, DRR goals. For instance, at the global scale, pro-
cesses such as globalisation have impacted the limits
and possibilities of disaster governance in many states
as a result of their effects on economic organisation
and political empowerment, particularly in the Global
South (Tierney, 2012, p. 346). At a national/local scale,
conflict politics can introduce new actors/dynamics or
influence decision making in ways that undermine DRR
and mitigation (Hilhorst, 2013). At local and individu-
al scales, grassroots organisations or individuals them-
selves may take responsibility for risk reduction activ-
ities, with or without consultation with government
authorities. For instance, borrowing an example from
Lassa (2010, p. 29), in earthquake-prone contexts where
building codes are lacking or poorly enforced, home-
owners may become individually responsible for decid-
ing whether to build earthquake-resilient houses or not.
These different scales and centres of authority in disaster
governance often overlap and can complement, contra-
dict, or compete with each other. Thus, distinctly differ-
ent local disaster governance characteristics can emerge
within a country that has a single overarching disaster
management framework.
As noted in the introduction, academic work using
the concept of disaster governance as a lens to explore
the multi-centred nature of decision-making around dis-
asters has grown significantly in the last decade (Lassa,
2010, 2011; Tierney, 2012; Walch, 2018), including in
India (Field & Kelman, 2018; Pal & Shaw, 2018; Pramanik,
2017; Rautela, 2018). The need to acknowledge complex-
ity in authority and decision making in disasters is also
reflected in global policy through the Sendai Framework
for DRR (SFDRR) 2015–2030, Priority 2: “Strengthening
Disaster Risk Governance to Manage Disaster Risk”
(UNDRR, 2015). This SFDRR priority recognises that the
central government has the primary responsibility to
reduce disaster risk, but that responsibility must also
be taken by a variety of other stakeholders, including
local government, the private sector, and civil society,
among others.
In 2016, India was one of the first countries to align
its National Disaster Management Plan with the Sendai
Framework—though this was arguably just building on
already-existing legislation with similar principles (Bhatt,
2018). Prior to the SFDRR, India’s National Disaster
Management Act, 2005, saw the formation of a National
Disaster Management Authority and mandated state
governments to establish State Disaster Management
Authorities (SDMA). SDMAs were to be key disaster man-
agement nodes, ensuring ongoing risk governance, pre-
paredness, and coordination in the event of a crisis (Sibal,
2020, p. 18). Decentralisation was recognised as essen-
tial to the prevention, risk reduction and management
of disasters (Sibal, 2020). Disaster Management Plans
should have subsequently been developed at all lev-
els (national, state, district) and the implementation of
these plans should be supported by district authorities
and city administrations, which retain a lot of author-
ity in disaster situations. However, while India is lead-
ing the way globally in the bureaucratic implementation
of Sendai Framework actions, its disaster governance
is largely characterised by top-down management and
uneven approaches to risk reduction at state and dis-
trict levels.
Colin Walch (2018) has argued that Odisha’s
response to cyclone Phailin in 2013, where minimal lives
were lost, is a strong example of effective decentralisa-
tion and collaboration across government networks and
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local actors. In this potentially catastrophic disaster, a
severe cyclone hit the coast of Odisha causing destruc-
tivewinds and flooding from a storm surge and torrential
rainfall; it affected 11 million people, but only 23 lives
were lost (Walch, 2018, p. 7). Odisha’s success at keep-
ing fatalities to a minimum is attributed to effective local
DRR and preparedness measures implemented by the
Odisha state government and local non-governmental
actors—these were themselves built on lessons learned
after a previous crisis. As Walch (2018) explains, the
devastating 1999 Odisha cyclone provided a traumatic
shock that catalysed the political leadership and local
actors into new ways of thinking around risk reduction
and preparedness. As a result, new institutions were cre-
ated, including the Odisha State Disaster Management
Authority—predating the SDMAs that followed the 2005
Disaster Management Act. These institutions promot-
ed new and more flexible collaboration with segments
of the population previously excluded, and a focus on
preparedness and mitigation in addition to relief and
recovery (Walch, 2018, pp. 7–8).
Elsewhere in the country, however, India has seen
less success. In Uttarakhand in 2013, for instance, heavy
rainfall caused landslides and floods that killed at least
6,000 people, as high rains coincided with an annu-
al Hindu pilgrimage to Kedarnath (Ziegler et al., 2014).
Though the annual monsoon had arrived earlier than
usual and heavy rainfall was predicted by the nation-
al Indian Meteorological Department, the information
was not effectively communicated to relevant actors on
the ground and the state government moved too late to
warn of floods. This failure at early warning intersected
with an absence of building regulations, expansive illegal
construction for the tourism industry, a spike in tourist
migration as a result of the pilgrimage, and hydroelec-
tric dam development that worsened the impact of the
floodwaters (Dash & Punia, 2019; Ziegler et al., 2014)—
ultimately resulting in significant damage and loss of life.
These impacts speak of a governance tension at the state
level between, on the one side, unsustainable tourism
expansion and hydropower development for the econo-
my and, on the other, the need for risk reduction and
preparedness planning.
Similar tensions were evident in Ladakh in 2010,
when a cloud burst and floods killed 257 people and
caused significant damage to Leh town and nearby vil-
lages (Comptroller and Auditor General of India [CAG],
2016, p. 1). Issues such as expansive tourism construc-
tions in hazard-exposed areas and non-implementation
of building codes exacerbated the scale of the 2010
disaster. Since then, Ladakh’s officials and civil society
have sought to learn from mistakes (DDMP consulta-
tions, July 8, 2019; Petterson et al., 2020). Unlike in the
case of Odisha, however, Ladakh continues to struggle to
improve disaster preparedness and risk reduction (Field
& Kelman, 2018; LeMasson, 2015). One aspect of this, as
scholars have effectively highlighted elsewhere (Dame,
Schmidt,Müller, &Nüsser, 2019; LeMasson, 2015), is the
continued expansion of the region’s tourism sector and
infrastructure that does notmeet DRR standards. In addi-
tion to this, conflict politics across the border in Kashmir
continue to affect power and decision making around
DRR, mitigation and relief in Ladakh. The following sec-
tion will offer a brief overview of the politics and haz-
ard profile of J&K, before examining in more detail how
politics and conflict in a neighbouring region can affect
DRR elsewhere.
4. Hazard Risks and Disaster Responses in India’s
Contested Borderland
Previously an independent Buddhist kingdom, Ladakh
was incorporated into J&K in the mid-19th century and
remained within the state after Partition in 1947, mak-
ing it a Buddhist-majority area nestled within a Muslim-
majority state in India. Since Partition, J&K has been
a contested region between India and Pakistan, and
has seen intra-state conflicts in 1947, 1965, 1971 and
1999. Ladakh’s neighbour, Kashmir, has been the site of
ongoing separatist protests and insurgency activity since
1987, which has resulted in recurrent clashes between
Indian forces and insurgents and high civilian casual-
ties (Staniland, 2013, p. 935). This conflict has result-
ed in a highly militarised army and police presence in
Kashmir Valley, and the long Himalayan stretch of the
border between India and Pakistan (and India and China)
is closed. In addition to wars with Pakistan, India also
fought—and lost—a war against China in 1962 and has
experienced several border confrontations and incur-
sions since then (Field & Kelman, 2018), with the most
serious occurring at the time of writing, beginning May
2020. Since 1962, Ladakh has had a permanent station-
ing of the Indian army across the region, and Ladakhi rela-
tions with the Indian army are broadly positive (Field &
Kelman, 2018)—a direct contrast with Kashmir, whose
residents largely see the military as an occupying force
(Venugopal & Yasir, 2017). While Kashmir has remained
open to domestic and visa-holding visitors, Ladakh was
closed off entirely to most foreigners and nationals until
1974 when it was partially re-opened to encourage
tourism. Both divisions are now heavily reliant on the
tourist economy.
Until February 2019, Ladakh was not its own divi-
sion within J&K but fell under the authority of Kashmir
division. Since at least the late 1950s, public figures in
Ladakh have articulated a sense of discrimination they
felt in the J&K State Assembly as a result of this sub-
ordinate arrangement—in terms of political represen-
tation, allocation of funds and development support
(Rizvi, 2011, p. 94; Shakspo, 2017, p. 73, p. 132). Of the
89 seats available in the J&K State Assembly prior to
2019, Ladakh had four, which had been criticised as
insufficient by Ladakhi figures for decades. Moreover,
Ladakh can still only send one MP to Delhi. These criti-
cisms of poor representation had (and continue to have)
anti-Kashmir and communal tones, as many Ladakhis
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have framed and experienced marginalisation in geopo-
litical and faith terms: a Buddhist-majority region being
overlooked by a Muslim-majority division (Kashmir) in
a Muslim-majority state (J&K) (van Beek, 2004, p. 196).
Between 1989 and 1993 communal tensions morphed
into confrontation as Buddhist groups in Leh turned their
frustration against the Kashmir administration towards
the Muslim-minority population within Ladakh, sparking
violence and boycotts (van Beek, 2000). The conflict was
diffused with the creation of the Ladakh Autonomous
Hill Development Councils of Leh in 1995 and Kargil in
2003, which has given the region a level of autonomy in
economic development, education, healthcare, land use
and other areas. Nonetheless, Ladakh’s state-level subor-
dination to Kashmir has continued to contribute to a gen-
eral feeling of remoteness and discrimination—themes
which will be picked up again shortly.
In terms of hazard risks, Ladakh and Kashmir are sit-
uated in seismic zones VI and V respectively (the high-
est earthquake risk categories), and the entire erstwhile
state of J&K is prone to a variety of hazards. During
winter, intense snowfall can cut off access roads to the
region for months (LDA, 2011). Avalanches and land-
slides are commonplace and, across summer and early
autumn, Ladakh is at high risk of flooding (Dame et al.,
2019; LDA, 2011; Le Masson, 2015). The cloud burst and
floods in August 2010, the peak of tourist season, came
as a shock to both residents and the administration—
and the responses were deemed inadequate (Interviews,
faith leaders, June 3, 2017; Interview, Ladakhi student-
researcher, June 2, 2017). Debris-ridden flood water
gushed through main thoroughfares in Leh, Ladakh’s
urbanised capital, and nearby villages, destroying com-
munication infrastructure, businesses and homes (Field
& Kelman, 2018). Local services were overwhelmed dur-
ing the crisis and the responsewas characterised by poor
coordination and communication between the military,
Ladakh administration, and local groups (Field & Kelman,
2018, p. 650). From the perspective of many locals,
the army offered welcome relief during the emergency
phase of the crisis, though this occurred largely in paral-
lel to ad hoc civilian relief efforts rather than in coordina-
tion with them (Interviews, faith leaders, June 3, 2017).
Prior to the event, mitigation strategies were largely
absent across Ladakh and much of the damage occurred
in hazard-exposed areas (Le Masson, 2015). A number
of bureaucratic, political and economic factors intersect-
ed to exacerbate the negative impact of the floods and
these continue to hamper risk reduction and mitigation,
despite local efforts to improve disaster governance.
5. Disaster Governance Plans and Politics in Ladakh
The central and state governments had undertaken lit-
tle in the way of DRR and preparedness in Ladakh prior
to the 2010 cloudburst—not least because of the reac-
tive, hazard-centred approach that characterises much
of the country’s disaster governance (Le Masson, 2015).
Moreover, because of Ladakh’s strategic location on the
borders of both Pakistan and China, ‘NewDelhi, together
with the state capital, Srinagar, [have become] involved
at every level of socioeconomic policies related to the
“development” of Ladakh’ (LeMasson, 2013, p. 127). Key
to the region’s economic and political development is
tourism. The tourism industry has not only become a cen-
tral economic lifeline for the region since it opened to
visitors in 1974, it has also become an important “flag
planting” activity encouraged by the centre in Delhi, as it
serves to clearly mark the contested area as part of India
(Norberg-Hodge, 1991, p. 92; Vogel & Field, 2020, p. 4).
The government has ‘single-mindedly push[ed] tourism
as the cornerstone of the “Ladakh” they are imagining,’
noted an editorial in a popular Ladakhimagazine recently
(Ghosal, 2019). This has resulted in a rapid urbanisation
of Ladakh’s towns and villages. Illegal tourism-related
constructions in flood-prone areas and the proliferation
of poor-quality infrastructure has rendered the popula-
tion in Ladakh highly vulnerable to and exposed to haz-
ards (as well as everyday disasters, such as contaminated
water and pollution; Dame et al., 2019).
Moreover, as Field and Kelman (2018) have high-
lighted, border conflict politics and the resultant per-
manent stationing of the military in Ladakh has led the
army to take a leading role in disaster management. This
has cemented a hazard-centred, command-and-control
approach to disaster management, exacerbating local
dependency on the military and underinvestment in
community preparedness and planning (Pramanik, 2017,
p. 192). In strategic areas at the national border-limits
of Ladakh, security priorities have also limited data gath-
ering/sharing about community vulnerabilities. External
NGOs struggle to gain central government permissions to
operate in the area altogether, limiting disaster-related
knowledge exchange (Field & Kelman, 2018).
Following the impacts of the 2010 disaster, a District
Disaster Management Plan for Leh was launched in 2011
and officials have been undertaking consultations in the
last few years in order to update it, recognising the lim-
itations of this first version (Interview, ADC Leh, June 8,
2017). Interestingly, this district-level document preced-
ed a state-level template. J&K approved its first-ever
State Disaster Management Plan (SDMP) only in 2015
(Rising Kashmir, 2015). This was prepared by the Tata
Institute of Social Sciences—who had earlier been con-
sulted about supporting the development of an SDMP
after Kashmir experienced an earthquake in 2013, but
the project saw limited movement until Kashmir’s dev-
astating 2014 floods (Rising Kashmir, 2015). Since then,
a flurry of DDMPs have been produced for Kashmir dis-
tricts, too.
A disaster management plan does not itself guar-
antee effective disaster governance. These bureaucrat-
ic documents form only one part of a wider devel-
opment and disaster governance eco-system. Also, to
be useful, paper schemes require quality content, such
as a factual evidence base, goals and objectives, and
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an effective strategy and tools for implementation and
evaluation (Kim & Marcouiller, 2018). The 2011 Leh
DDMP (LDA, 2011) is not a ‘quality’ plan in that sense.
It is hazard-centred and lacks any analysis of socio-
economic vulnerability and capacity (Le Masson, 2015,
p. 107). Moreover, a central government audit of J&K
disaster capacity in 2016 noted that it had still yet
to be implemented or reviewed (CAG, 2016). The Leh
DDMP, like many of the State and DDMPs across India,
is characterised by a command-and-control approach
to disasters—focused on reaction rather than mitiga-
tion and preparedness (Field & Kelman, 2018; Pramanik,
2017, p. 192). Nonetheless, its publication and subse-
quent efforts to revise it indicate a commitment to aug-
ment the region’s disaster governance. Moreover, Leh’s
ADC from 2016–2019 took particular leadership in this
endeavour. The ADC, a senior figure in Ladakh’s gov-
ernance, supported the development of the 2011 plan
while in a different administrative role, and spearhead-
ed the revision of the 2011 version when he took over
as ADC in 2016—mobilising local research resources
and engaging in numerous consultations (Interview, ADC,
June 8, 2017; DDMP consultation, July 8, 2019). Notably,
Kargil district did not develop its own DDMP until 2017—
highlighting an imbalance of disaster governance activity
within Ladakh itself.
Following the 2010 floods, Ladakh civil society also
mobilised to augment local capacity and resilience:
officials and locals hosted DRR workshops on multi-
ple occasions post-2010 (Ahmed et al., 2019; Johnson,
2014; Petterson et al., 2020); the Ladakh Ecological
Development Group (LEDeG) rebuilt some of the
destroyed buildings using earthquake-resistant designs
(Le Masson, 2015, p. 108; SEEDS India & LEDeG, 2010);
and LehNutrition Partnership (LNP) supported the design
and construction of new schools following DRR principles
(Interview, LNP, June 7, 2017; Le Masson, 2015, p. 108).
However, these initiativeswere primarily directed by local
NGOs in collaboration with national or international civil
society partners—for instance, LEDeGworkedwith SEEDS
India, and LNP with Save the Children India. As such, they
were discreet projects with time and finance limitations,
disconnected from wider governance systems such as
urban planning and development. Local community lead-
ers noted there continued to be an absence of any sus-
tainedDRR-related activity (Interview, faith leader, June 3,
2017). This was a result, partly, of local bureaucratic iner-
tia, but it has also been affected by Ladakh’s actual and
perceived marginalisation within J&K governance.
Taking the first point of bureaucratic inertia, the
Ladakh administration has suffered a lack of state invest-
ment in disaster-related capacity. The central govern-
ment audit of J&K disaster capacity noted in 2016
that District Disaster Management Authorities—boards
of local officials and experts responsible for disaster
management planning and coordination—had yet to be
established across J&K (CAG, 2016, p. 5).While Leh’s ADC
took personal responsibility for reviewing and updating
the 2011 Leh DDMP, this was done in and around his day-
to-day governance responsibilities for Ladakh. Interviews
and DRR-related meetings I conducted with local civ-
il society organisations and government officials in Leh
during the summers of 2017 and 2019 suggested that
the sustainability of DRR activities was still frustrated
by a lack of systematic coordination. An official from
the Tourism Department of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill
Development Council Leh noted that, although mock
evacuation drills had recently started, ‘we need a dis-
aster management unit here’ (Interview, LAHDC Official,
June 3, 2017). The director of the LNP also remarked that
there continues to be, ‘no DRR forum for Ladakhi organ-
isations to share ideas. Only a cluster in the immediate
aftermath of 2010’ (Interview, LNP, June 7, 2017).
The Ladakh administration’s inconsistent attention
to disaster-related matters beyond the drawn-out devel-
opment of management plans can be understood part-
ly through Indian bureaucracy’s tendency to deal with
future risk by materialising scientific and technical exper-
tise through the production of documents rather than
action (Gagné, 2019, p. 844; Mathur, 2014). However,
this inertia was also exacerbated by poor support from
state and central government. State level funds ear-
marked for both the establishment of an Emergency
Operation Centre and multi-hazard risk mapping at a dis-
trict level were not utilised in Ladakh or other districts
in J&K (CAG, 2016, p. vi). The ADC Leh remarked in a
2017 interview that he was not aware of DRR funds avail-
able within the state that Ladakh could utilise (Interview,
ADC, June 8, 2017). A local NGO worker remarked that,
‘huge money is given to the states by the centre for
disaster mitigation, [but] the money for J&K is often
returned to the centre’ because it is unused (Interview,
LNP, June 7, 2017).Moreover, what is notable in the time-
line of disaster plan productions outlined above is that
the development of Leh’s DDMP came without a state-
level foundation—despite both being mandatory under
the National Disaster Management Act of 2005. The J&K
government did not seek to develop any State Disaster
Management Plan or division-level guidance around dis-
aster governance in response to Ladakh’s 2010 disaster;
rather, it took two consecutive crises in Kashmir to kick-
start a review and plan. Such oversight has materially
contributed to the underdevelopment of Ladakh’s disas-
ter governance (at least in terms of paper plans), but
it also characterises a historic neglect or discrimination
that Ladakhis have felt by the administration in Kashmir,
which has its own implications for disaster vulnerability.
6. Ladakh in Relation to Kashmir: Conflict Politics
Trust relations between a population, civil society and
the government play a central part in reducing dis-
aster risk. Poor State-civil society relations can result
in fragmented or duplicative responses and risk reduc-
tion activities (Tierney, 2012, p. 351). A lack of trust
between citizens and their government, or a feeling of
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discrimination, can result in populations ignoring early
warnings, refusing to take part in mitigation activities
and diminishing returns on recovery activities (Forino et
al., 2018, p. 1; Sandoval & Voss, 2016, p. 114). Karine
Gagné’s (2019) study of the 2015 Phuktal floods offers
an important example of how a sense of discrimination
in Ladakh by the government in J&K has spilled into
disaster governance and vulnerability. When a threat
of a natural dam burst and a subsequent flood was
facing the Buddhist region of Zanskar in the Muslim-
majority district of Kargil, the state and central govern-
ment’s (mis)management of mitigation and evacuation
was viewed through the lens of historic communal dis-
crimination, as well as ‘the incompetence of the state
and its disregard for local concerns’ (Gagné, 2019, p. 848).
The J&K government imposed mobility restrictions on
the Zanskar population in order to reduce hazard risk.
These restrictions were the same as those imposed
during the 1989 communal agitations when the state
government attempted to quell Ladakhi Buddhist agita-
tions against Ladakhi Muslims—an observation that was
not lost on Zanskar residents. This communal backdrop,
Gagné (2019, p. 843) argues, exacerbatedmistrust in the
government’s disaster mitigation activities and augment-
ed vulnerability, as it affected the way that the Zanskar
community received and interpreted communications
from J&K about the disaster risks they faced.
Mistrust in Srinagar-based authorities is widespread
in Ladakh, as Ladakhis have read other restrictive mea-
sures undertaken by J&K and the central government
as part of a wider agenda of neglect or discrimination.
When there is a spike in violence (or potential violence) in
Kashmir or Jammu, the government implements repres-
sive measures—some of which affect Ladakh. In August
2013, for instance, the Internet was suspended for
five days in Ladakh, along with the rest of J&K, fol-
lowing Muslim-Hindu communal riots in Kishtwar, in
Jammu (Press Trust of India, 2013). More recently, fol-
lowing the UT status announcement in August 2019,
Kashmir and parts of Ladakh had their Internet cut for an
extended period—including 145 days in Kargil (Internet
Shutdowns, 2020). While these two communication cuts
are known to be externally imposed, interviews and
online discussions in Ladakh have intimated suspicion
that other more frequent (though typically much short-
er), drops in the Internet are also connected to vio-
lence and politics in Kashmir, despite Ladakh’s discon-
nect from Kashmir’s separatist politics. One Facebook
user on a popular online forum—‘Ladakh in theMedia’—
commented on a 2017 post by political leader N. Rigzin
Jora, that: ‘Since [the] Kashmir mass uprising, all Wimax
connections were suspended [in Ladakh] almost for
more than three months’ (Wangail, 2017). It is perceived
that these cuts are used either as a means to prevent
dissent spreading (Interview, Ladakhi student-researcher,
June 2, 2017), or they are seen as part of state-level
efforts to keep Ladakh marginalised. Facebook user
Mohd Hussain echoedmany similar posts on the ‘Ladakh
in the Media’ group about weak communication infras-
tructure when he commented on a different 2017 post
by a local activist: ‘Now, the broken connection in zojil-
la area is a big joke in 21st century. The state as well
as the centre [are] always discriminating [against] the
ladakhis’ (Hussain, 2017; see also similar comments on
Wangail, 2017). These forums provide important means
for Ladakhis to speak directly to political leaders and
voice their concerns about political issues—and such
comments underline an ongoing mistrust in the state
and a sense that Kashmir politics directly affects Ladakh’s
material wellbeing. As highlighted in relation to the
Phuktal floods, mistrust can entrench power (or a sense
of powerlessness) and can reproduce or exacerbate exist-
ing inequalities (Forino et al., 2018, p. 1).
Beyond issues of trust, disrupted communication
also presents a material disaster risk factor. Disaster
governance—indeed everyday governance—benefits
from working and accessible communication for early
warning and general information (Rautela, 2018, p. 178;
Toya & Skidmore, 2018, p. 2). As Cutter, Boruff, and
Shirley (2003, p. 245) have argued, a lack of access to
resources, including information, knowledge and tech-
nology, are ‘major factors’ that affect social vulnerability
to hazards. Phone and Internet infrastructure enable
residents to access risk-related information, to connect
to each other (their local socio-economic safety-nets)
and also to communicate with their government (for
accountability)—all of which are prevented through com-
munication shutdowns. A recent study of DRR awareness
among students in Ladakh indicated their earthquake
and landslide risk knowledge came primarily from the
Internet and television media (Petterson et al., 2020,
pp. 273–274). Frequent Internet cuts risk disrupting key
information channels. While some communication chal-
lenges in Ladakh are a consequence of its remote loca-
tion in the Himalaya, the cuts in August 2013 and 2019
were due to state intervention to quell protest or vio-
lence. Moreover, Ladakhi frustration around what they
perceive is deliberatemarginalisationmay affect the way
they receive and interpret future disaster risk informa-
tion from external authorities.
Conflict politics in Kashmir have also negatively
impacted Ladakh’s economy, which may heighten haz-
ard vulnerability through its knock-on effect on the
ability of Ladakhis to withstand shocks. In February
2019, for instance, a Kashmiri youth killed more than
40 Indian army soldiers in a suicide attack in the
Kashmir’s Pulwama district. In response, the central gov-
ernment temporarily closed J&K’s National Highway 44
in April 2019 for two days a week—a vital transport
artery for Ladakh for goods and tourists. Security scares
such as these frequently contribute to drops in tourism
for Ladakh—both as a result of tourists’ safety fears,
and road closures that prevent tourists from arriving
there. During fieldwork in Leh in the summer of 2019,
interviews and media reports suggested visitor num-
bers had dropped as much as 50% compared with the
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previous year, and many attributed this to a combina-
tion of Pulwama-related security concerns, road closures,
national elections and the collapse of amajor airline serv-
ing Leh (Interview, market trader, September 6, 2019;
Press Trust of India, 2019). Going further back, Sunetro
Ghosal (2019, p. 5) analysed data from the Tourism
Departments in Leh and Kargil and noted that signifi-
cant drops in tourist numbers over the last three decades
broadly tallied with conflict events over the border: i.e.,
in 1990 following increasedmilitancy in Kashmir; in 1999
as a result of war with Pakistan; in 2008 following a
land transfer controversy and mass protests in Kashmir
Valley; and in 2016 after a spike in unrest in Kashmir.
Kargil is particularly affected by these events as it ismuch
more reliant on tourist entries via the road from Srinagar
(whereas Leh has an airport), though many households
across Ladakh are reliant on tourism for their income
(Vogel & Field, 2020). Economic insecurity affects the
capacity of these households to ‘anticipate, cope with,
resit and recover from the impact of a natural hazard’
(Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2003, p. 11). However,
because such shocks result from a conflict for which
Ladakh is not directly a party, opportunities for Ladakhis
to anticipate disruption or contribute to mitigating the
effects of the conflict-disaster nexus are constrained.
Since UT status came into force on 31 October 2019,
Kashmir and J&K state have now been removed as inter-
mediary authorities in Ladakh’s governance system, as
the UT of Ladakh now falls under Delhi. However, it is
not clear at the time of writing whether that will result
in a tangible decentralisation of power and resources
to Ladakhis, or perhaps even a further loss of pow-
er to the centre, as much is still under consideration
(Lundup & Fazily, 2020). Moreover, while Leh was more
broadly welcoming of UT status, residents in Kargil have
strong faith-linkages and road/trade connections with
Kashmir—resulting in divided opinion over the benefits
of UT to Ladakh as awhole (Vogel & Field, 2020). This ten-
sion demands a look at the relational politics of disaster
governance within Ladakh itself.
In terms of disaster governance for Ladakh in relation
to Kashmir, what UT status has changed is the immediate
relevance and utility of Leh and Kargil’s DDMPs. Indeed,
much of the reporting and governance information in
these plans is now obsolete. UT also has implications for
disaster leadership, as government officials have been
shuffled around to different positions in this new polit-
ical territory. The ADC of Leh who took personal respon-
sibility for the Leh DDMP revisions has now been pro-
moted into a different role overseeing urban local bod-
ies, industry and commerce. What UT has not changed is
Ladakh’s geographical and historical ties to Kashmir and
wider J&K, and the complex interaction of security and
development across the two locales. As such, there is
the possibility of continued Internet black outs, road clo-
sures, fluctuations in tourism and a sense of marginalisa-
tion caused by politics, policies and conflict in Kashmir—
all of which may heighten future hazard vulnerability.
7. Conclusion
Disaster-related power relations and politics are not
neatly containedwithin geopolitical boundaries; they are
affected by actions, events and politics that transcend
borders in messy and non-liner ways. While disaster gov-
ernance literature explores how local contexts are affect-
ed by national and international power and politics, less
explored is how local contexts can be affected by power
and politics in neighbouring locales. Taking up this issue,
this article has analysed Ladakh’s disaster governance in
relation to neighbouring Kashmir.
Firstly, I examined the disaster-related inequalities
and vulnerabilities that have arisen in Ladakh as a result
of its power relationswith J&K State and the government
in Delhi. Local narratives and experiences of political
marginalisation by Kashmir within J&K have developed
anti-Kashmir and communal tones—resulting in violence
in 1989, and an ongoing trust deficit thatwas, until gover-
nance changes in 2019, characterised by a sense of pow-
erlessnesswithin regional political structures.Mistrust in
authorities in Kashmir and Delhi heightened hazard vul-
nerability in relation to the 2015 Phuktal floods (Gagné,
2019), and risks exacerbating vulnerability in the face of
future hazards, as many Ladakhis have long attributed
the region’s underdevelopment to a Kashmir-linked agen-
da of deliberate marginalisation. In addition, Ladakh’s
disaster risk profile has been materially affected by con-
flict politics in Kashmir and Jammu. Ladakh has faced
frequent communication black outs, road closures and
drops in tourist numbers (onwhom they rely for econom-
ic stability)—heightening hazard vulnerability.
These are not the only factors affecting disaster risk
in Ladakh. Similar to Uttarakhand in 2013, illegal tourism
expansion and poor enforcement of building standards
across Ladakh continue to exacerbate hazard risks (Dame
et al., 2019). However, through taking a relational per-
spective and examining Ladakh’s disaster management
aspirations as they have been affected by Kashmir, this
article has shown that effective disaster governance at
the local scale is not just contingent on programmes
and policies developed by actors rooted in one context.
It is also conditional on conducive politics and policies in
neighbouring territories whose history and politics may
be bound together in direct and indirect ways. While this
article has focused on one single case study, it is hoped
that a relational perspective can be applied to examine
disaster governance in other contexts—particularly in sit-
uations where conflict politics in one area may affect the
disaster risk and governance situation of a neighbour-
ing locale.
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